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ABSTRACT: Inquiries about a prospective applicant’s salary history are
controversial because of the role such inequities play in the broader gender pay
equity debate. The use of prior salary to determine compensation can perpetuate
pay discrimination for women, especially women of color, and lock them into
cycles of underpayment when these inequities are carried over from job to job.
Reliance on salary history perpetuates historical discrimination and is
antithetical to the language and purpose of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. The
purpose of this paper is to critically analyze the legal reasoning relied upon to
interpret these laws, especially in light of the new cases emerging in this field,
and to assess the potential impacts of these differing interpretations across the
circuit courts. This paper offers a nuanced analysis of the courts’ reasoning,
including an analysis of the text and context of the legislation and how this
influences appellate courts’ divergent interpretation and reasoning. Given that
this circuit split primes the issue for Supreme Court consideration, this Article
considers the implications of the various interpretations.
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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE EQUAL PAYACT AND THECIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE
USE OF SALARY HISTORY
The Equal Pay Act (“EPA” or “Act”) was originally passed in 1963 to
eliminate disparities in pay based on sex.
1
However, more than fifty years after
its passage, the wage gap persists.
2
Women confront a pervasive “gender-based
wage gap across industries, occupations, and education levels.”
3
This Article
assesses the differing interpretations of the EPA in the current circuit split,
analyzing whether prior salary history is a factor other than sex that can be
considered by employers whenmaking salary determinations, as well as the legal
and social impacts of these different approaches.
Currently, there is a robust national debate about the extent to which
employers can rely on prior salary history in the context of the EPA. The debate
in the courts has significant consequences for countless workers: if prior salary
history is a factor other than sex, employers may permissibly consider a female
employee’s previous wages to make salary determinations, despite the fact that
women’s wages are often impacted by sex and that such a policy would
perpetuate existing cycles of under-payment. Against the backdrop of a broad
1. Although gender and sex have distinct meanings, the terms are used interchangeably in this paper
to describe the pay gap, which is based on both an individual’s biological or physiological traits as well a
person’s gender identity in the context of society’s perception and treatment of the individual (biases,
expectations, tropes, roles, etc.). This understanding is meant to be inclusive of transgender, gender-queer,
gender-fluid, and gender non-conforming individuals.
2. Yuki Noguchi, 50 Years After The Equal Pay Act, Gender Wage Gap Endures, NPR (June 10,
2013), https://www.npr.org/2013/06/10/189280329/50-years-after-the-equal-pay-act-gender-wage-gap-
endures [https://perma.cc/6TQB-BH7H].
3. JEANNE H. BALLANTINE, KEITH A. ROBERTS & KATHLEEN ODELL KORGEN, OUR SOCIAL
WORLD: INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY 276 (7th ed. 2016).
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national debate on the issue of gender pay equity, much of the recent emphasis
on salary history stemmed from a Ninth Circuit opinion that deepened an existing
split between the federal courts of appeal on the question of whether prior salary
is a “factor other than sex” under the EPA.
4
Aileen Rizo was hired as a math consultant by the Fresno County Office of
Education in 2009. Pursuant to the office’s established policy, Rizo’s salary as a
new employee was “based exclusively on [her] most recent prior pay, regardless
of qualifications, education, or even the kind of work the individual had been
doing”; thus, Rizo began on step one of the salary scale.
5
But in 2012, she
discovered that a newly hired male math consultant had started on step nine of
the salary scale, with an initial salary $13,000 more than Rizo’s fourth year
salary, despite being less educated and less experienced than Rizo.
6
The County
conceded Rizo’s prima facie case: “Rizo is paid less than her male colleagues
for performing the exact same job.”
7
However, despite acknowledging that Rizo
was paid less than her male counterpart for the same work, the County asserted
that the discrepancy was permissible because it was based on Rizo’s prior
salary—a “factor other than sex.”
8
The district court sided with Rizo, determining that her prior salary history
was not a valid factor under the EPA.
9
On an interlocutory appeal, the Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court based on the circuit’s prevailing precedent in
Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Company, before ordering rehearing of the case en
banc.
10
A six-judge majority of the Ninth Circuit held that “[p]rior salary,
whether considered alone or with other factors, is not job related and thus does
not fall within an exception to the Act that allows employers to pay disparate
wages.”
11
In overruling Kouba, the majority “conclude[s], unhesitatingly, that
‘any other factor other than sex’ is limited to legitimate, job-related factors such
as a prospective employee’s experience, educational background, ability, or prior
job performance.”
12
The majority opinion received attention not only because it overturned
Kouba to set new precedent in the Ninth Circuit and deepened the existing circuit
4. Danielle Paquette, Court: Employers Can’t Pay Women Less Because of Their Salary History,
WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/04/09/court-
employers-cant-pay-women-less-because-of-their-salary-history/?utm_term=.3c4569fa4a29
[https://perma.cc/3EK4-2HLS].
5. Brief for Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee,
Rizo v. Yovino, 2016 WL 5869872 (9th Cir. Oct. 5, 2016) (No. 14-cv-4932) at 4.
6. Id. at 4.
7. Brief for Appellee at 21, Rizo v. Yovino, 2016 WL 5846093 (9th Cir. Sept. 28, 2016).
8. Id.
9. Rizo v. Yovino, 2015 WL 9260587, at 9 (E.D. Cal. 2015).
10. Rizo v. Yovino, 854 F.3d 1161, 1163 (9th Cir. 2017), reh’g en banc granted, 869 F.3d 1004 (9th
Cir. 2017), and on reh’g en banc, 887 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691
F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 1982).
11. Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d at 460 (9th Cir. 2018).
12. Id.
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split by determining that salary history could never be used, but also because it
was one of the final opinions authored by the late Judge Stephen Reinhardt.
13
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion noted that “[p]rior to his death, Judge Reinhardt fully
participated in this case and authored this opinion. The majority opinion and all
concurrences were final, and voting was completed by the en banc court prior to
his death.”
14
Counsel for the Fresno County School District appealed the Ninth Circuit’s
en banc decision to the United States Supreme Court, providing the Court an
immediate opportunity to serve as a final arbiter to this question on the use of
salary history.
15
However, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Ninth
Circuit’s decision on other grounds, which may ultimately permit employers to
consider workers’ prior salaries. The Court instead addressed the issue of
whether the circuit court erred when it counted Judge Reinhardt as a member of
the majority since he died before the court’s opinion in this case was issued on
April 9, 2018, eleven days after he passed away on March 29.
16
The Court
determined that “the Ninth Circuit erred in counting [Judge Reinhardt] as a
member of the majority” by allowing “a deceased judge to exercise the judicial
power . . . after his death,” noting that “federal judges are appointed for life, not
for eternity.”
17
The Supreme Court’s decision, though it did not directly address the
question of salary history, vacated the Ninth Circuit’s precedent on this question.
With Judge Reinhardt’s vote, the majority of six of eleven judges would have
“constitute[d] a precedent that all future Ninth Circuit panels must follow.”
18
As
the Supreme Court observed, “[w]ithout Judge Reinhardt’s vote, the opinion
attributed to him would have been approved by only five of the ten members of
the en banc panel who were still living when the decision was filed. Although
the other five living judges concurred in the judgment, they did so for different
reasons.”
19
Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision has the potential to revive case law that
allows employers to consider workers’ prior salaries, at least in certain
circumstances, in Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
Oregon, Washington, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands. In the wake of
the Supreme Court’s per curiam decision in Rizo v. Yovino, the debate over the
13. Sam Roberts, Stephen Reinhardt, Liberal Lion of Federal Court, Dies at 87, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/02/obituaries/stephen-reinhardt-liberal-lion-of-federal-court
-dies-at-87.html [https://perma.cc/985J-W94L].
14. Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 455 (9th Cir. 2018).
15. McGuire Woods, 9th Circuit: Employers May Not Use Pay History as Defense to Equal Pay Act
Claims (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.mcguirewoods.com/Client-Resources/Alerts/2018/4/9th-Circuit-
Employers-Pay-History-Defense-Equal-Pay-Act-Claims.aspx [https://perma.cc/VM9R-JM2S].
16. Yovino v. Rizo, 139 S. Ct. 706, 708 (2019).
17. Id. at 710.
18. Id. at 708.
19. Id.
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use of salary history in the courts is ongoing. Importantly, this deliberation in the
courts is occurring against a backdrop of legislative action by several state and
localities, many of which have banned employers from inquiring about an
employee’s prior salary.
20
The question of prior salary history has generated sharp division because of
the ongoing role it plays in broader gender pay equity debate. Many advocates
argue against an employer’s use of prior salary history because “reliance on that
information to determine compensation, forces women and, especially women
of color, to carry lower earnings and pay discrimination with them from job to
job.”
21
As such, reliance on salary history perpetuates historical discrimination
and is antithetical to the language and purpose of the EPA. However, others see
salary history as an essential, non-discriminatory inquiry. There are many
employers that “use salary history to evaluate and compare applicants’ job
responsibilities and achievements,” “to determine the market value of an
applicant or the position,” even though “salary is not a neutral, objective factor”
for decision making.
22
Although estimates of the wage gap vary, on average, women earn seventy-
seven cents for every dollar that men earn.
23
Ongoing research demonstrates that
pay disparities are worse for women of color
24
and can be exacerbated by
geographic differences.
25
According to one estimate, “women employed full
time in the United States lose a combined total of more than $900 billion every
year due to the wage gap.”
26
20. Ryan Golden & Valerie Bolden-Barrett, Women Who Refuse to Disclose Salary History More
Likely to Be Paid Less, HR DIVE (June 29, 2017), https://www.hrdive.com/news/women-who-refuse-to-
disclose-salary-history-more-likely-to-be-paid-less/445993/ [https://perma.cc/A85F-5V9M].
21. Asking for Salary History Perpetuates Pay Discrimination from Job to Job, NAT’L WOMEN’S




22. Id. at 1-2.
23. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JESSICA C. SMITH, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 5
http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p60-245.pdf [https://perma.cc/8G2X-6EKE].
24. National Partnership for Women & Families, QUANTIFYINGAMERICA’SGENDERWAGEGAP BY
RACE (Sept. 2017), http://www.nationalpartnership.org/our-work/resources/workplace/fair-pay/quant
ifying-americas-gender-wage-gap-by-race-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/TXJ4-6LDF].
25. National Women’s Law Center, THE LIFETIME WAGE GAP, STATE BY STATE (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://nwlc.org/resources/the-lifetime-wage-gap-state-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/39P3-9GBZ].
26. National Partnership for Women & Families, AMERICA’SWOMEN AND THEWAGE GAP 2 (Apr.
2018), http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/workplace-fairness/fair-pay/americas-women
-and-the-wage-gap.pdf [https://perma.cc/U28W-6LA8].
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To address issue of pay inequity, the EPA requires:
No employer . . . shall discriminate . . . between employees on the basis
of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less
than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex
in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which
requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed
under similar working conditions[.]
27
This language adopts an equal pay for equal work standard, in which two
similarly situated employees who are performing the same work must be paid
the same, regardless of their sex. The EPA creates four exceptions to this general
rule, where salary differentials between the sexes can be permissible “pursuant
to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures
earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any
other factor other than sex.”
28
To establish a prima facie case under the EPA, the plaintiff must show: “i)
the employer pays different wages to employees of the opposite sex; ii) the
employees perform equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and
responsibility; and iii) the jobs are performed under similar working
conditions.”
29
Because the EPA does not have an intent requirement,
30
once the
plaintiff has demonstrated that workers of one sex are paid more for equal work
than are employees of the opposite sex, the burden of proof shifts to the
employer; the employer defendant must show the pay differential is justified,
such as under one of the Equal Pay Act’s four exceptions, which constitute an
affirmative defense to the claim.
31
If the defendant satisfies their burden, the
plaintiff may still rebut with evidence that the employer’s proffered reason was
a pretext for discrimination on the basis of sex.
32
The purpose of this Article is to critically analyze the legal reasoning relied
upon to interpret the EPA in the context of prior salary history cases, as well as
to assess the potential impacts of these differing interpretations across the circuit
courts. Part II will analyze the circuit split on the question of salary history as a
“factor other than sex” under the EPA, including the arguments related to the
statute’s text, legislative history, and purpose. Part III will provide a summary of
legislative action that has been taken with regard to salary history. Part IV will
evaluate some of the current and potential policy consequences resulting from
27. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
28. Id.
29. Belfi v. Prendergast, 191 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir. 1999).
30. Meeks v. Comput. Assocs. Int’l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1019 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that “[i]n contrast
to Title VII, the EPA establishes a form of ‘strict liability’”).
31. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196 (1974).
32. Belfi, 191 F.3d at 136.
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the ongoing salary history debate. Finally, Part V will provide a summary of the
main conclusions and recommendations of this Article.
II. THECIRCUIT SPLIT: IS PRIOR SALARY A “FACTOROTHER THAN SEX”?
The federal courts of appeal are split on the question of whether prior salary
is a “factor other than sex” under the EPA. These different methods of
interpreting the EPA in turn influence the role that prior salary history can play
in making employment compensation decisions. This Section summarizes the
circuits’ varying perspectives.
The courts’ divergent interpretations arise from the different textual
interpretations, legislative history, and purpose-based arguments they consider.
The textual interpretation of the EPA is informed by each court’s understanding
of legitimate business reasons that could permissibly constitute a “factor other
than sex.” A court’s skepticism of a company’s business decision making and its
inclination to override employers’ exercise of that judgment influence the textual
analysis. Additionally, although not every circuit considers legislative history,
the understanding of the legislative history and comparisons with other
exceptions to the EPA also inform the approach that the courts have taken.
Finally, the courts have also relied on the EPA’s remedial purpose in assessing
whether prior wages are a “factor other than sex.”
A. Summarizing the Approaches Adopted by the Circuits
One perspective is that the Equal Pay Act does not permit the consideration
of prior salary history. The Ninth Circuit explained this interpretation in its recent
en banc decision in Rizo v. Yovino, in which the court held that “prior salary
alone or in combination with other factors cannot justify a wage differential.”
33
The court reasoned that there was an attenuated relationship between prior salary
and legitimate factors other than sex that relate to qualification, skill, or
experience; as such, salary history “does not fit within the catchall exception
because it is not a legitimate measure of work experience, ability, performance,
or any other job-related quality.”
34
Accordingly, employers in the Ninth Circuit’s
jurisdiction may not rely on salary history in their employment decisions.
Although this decision has been vacated by the Supreme Court on the grounds
that Judge Reinhardt’s vote was impermissibly counted in the six-judge majority
and does not carry precedential weight, the majority’s reasoning nonetheless
presents a unique analysis of the salary history inquiry. The term “majority” is
still used in this Article to distinguish this analysis from the three concurring
33. 887 F.3d 453, 456 (9th Cir. 2018).
34. Id. at 467.
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opinions adopted by the remaining five judges of the court; the remaining judges
concurred in the judgment, but declined to adopt the full breadth of the reasoning
set forth in Judge Reinhardt’s opinion.
The second mode of analysis, proffered by the Seventh Circuit, directly
opposes the Ninth Circuit’s position. Under the Seventh Circuit’s approach,
salary history is always a “factor other than sex.” The court has acknowledged
that “many empirical studies show that women’s wages are less than men’s on
average,” but it ultimately determined that discriminatory wage patterns are
“something to be proved rather than assumed.”
35
Since all market wages cannot
be assumed to be discriminatory, unless the plaintiff can prove that that “sex
discrimination led to lower wages in the ‘feeder’ jobs” or that the employer’s
wage scale directly violated the Equal Pay Act, there is no actionable claim.
36
As
such, employers may freely consider salary history, with only narrow exceptions.
The third approach, adopted by several circuits, stakes out a middle ground
between the positions of the Ninth and Seventh Circuits and allows employers
to assess prior salary history under specific circumstances. Circuit courts have
articulated this position in different ways. The Eighth Circuit permits employers
to use prior salary as an affirmative defense, but the “court carefully examines
the record to ensure that an employer does not rely on the prohibited ‘market
force theory’ to justify lower wages for female employees.”
37
Similarly, the
Second Circuit allows salary history to be used as an affirmative defense if the
employer can prove “that a bona fide business-related reason exists for using the
gender-neutral factor that results in a wage differential in order to establish the
factor-other-than-sex defense.”
38
The Eleventh Circuit has held that prior salary
history, on its own, “cannot solely carry the affirmative defense,”
39
as has the
Tenth Circuit by prohibiting “an employer from relying solely upon a prior salary
to justify pay disparity.”
40
The Ninth Circuit’s concurring opinions in Rizo v. Yovino echo this
perspective. Judge McKeown’s concurrence, joined by Judge Murguia, eschews
the majority’s bright-line test categorically banning the consideration of prior
salary history in favor of an approach that uses “prior salary along with valid job-
related factors such as education, past performance and training . . . [to] provide
a lawful benchmark for starting salary in appropriate cases.”
41
Judge Callahan,
joined by Judge Tallman, expressed that while it was impermissible to use “prior
pay” as the exclusive determinant of pay under the EPA, “prior pay is not
inherently a reflection of gender discrimination” because those differences could
35. Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Services, 427 F.3d 466, 470 (7th Cir. 2005).
36. Id.
37. Drum v. Leeson Elec. Corp., 565 F.3d 1071, 1073 (8th Cir. 2009).
38. Aldrich v. Randolph Ctr. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 526 (2d Cir. 1992).
39. Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949, 955 (11th Cir. 1995).
40. Riser v. QEP Energy, 776 F.3d 1191, 1199 (10th Cir. 2015).
41. Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 470 (9th Cir. 2018).
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be based on other, legitimate factors “such as the cost of living in different parts
of our country.”
42
The final concurrence, by Judge Watford, reasoned that an
employer may rely on prior salary but “bears the burden of proving that its female
employees’ past pay is not tainted by sex discrimination, including
discriminatory pay differentials attributable to prevailing market forces . . .
[which] in most instances that will be exceedingly difficult to do.”
43
Under this third approach, courts allow employers to consider salary history,
but not as the sole justification for gender pay disparities. This perspective aligns
most closely with that of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC” or “Commission”), which takes the position that “prior pay alone
cannot justify a compensation disparity under the EPA because the practice
perpetuates the gender pay gap that continues to exist.”
44
Given this range of
possible interpretations, it is important to understand the reasoning upon which
the EEOC and circuit courts have based their analysis, in order to fully appreciate
how these differing statutory readings directly impact female workers.
B. Analyzing the Textual Arguments Presented in the Circuit Split
The EPA requires that:
[n]o employer . . . shall discriminate . . . between employees on the basis
of sex by paying wages to employees . . . at a rate less than the rate at
which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex . . . for equal
work . . . [that] requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility . . .
performed under similar working conditions[.]
45
The EPA also permits employers to assert an affirmative defense to justify
an identified pay gap based on “any other factor other than sex.”
46
Relying on this language, the circuits have differed in their understanding of
what should fall within the scope of a permissible “factor other than sex.” In
characterizing what constitutes an “acceptable business reason” for salary
differences under this catchall exception, courts’ interpretations have been
influenced by two factors. The first factor is the closeness with which courts
scrutinize the pretext behind an employer’s decisions. A court’s interpretation is
strongly influenced by its willingness to critically assess the legitimacy of an
42. Id. at 477.
43. Id. at 478-79.
44. Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiff-Appellee and in Favor of Affirmance, Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 16-
15372), 2016WL 5869872 (explaining the EEOC “is the agency charged with interpreting, administering,
and enforcing the Equal Pay Act along with other federal employment discrimination statutes”) (internal
citations omitted).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
46. Id.
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employer’s reliance on salary history and the purported connection to
experience, ability, or other job-related performance metrics. The second is the
court’s willingness to defer to the employer’s business judgment. A court’s
understanding of the statutory provision is influenced by its willingness not
merely to insert itself as an economic agent in the market, but possibly to
contradict an employer’s business judgment.
The Ninth Circuit majority interpreted “factor other than sex” as “limited to
legitimate, job-related factors such as a prospective employee’s experience,
educational background, ability, or prior job performance.”
47
In reaching this
conclusion, the Ninth Circuit relied on two canons of construction: noscitur a
sociis and ejusdem generis.
The canon noscitur a sociis gives related meaning to words grouped together
in a list. Applied to the text of the EPA, “factor other than sex” appears as a
catchall exception along with three specific exemptions to the pay parity
requirement: seniority, merit, and productivity systems. The court reasoned that
these three exclusions “share more in common than mere gender neutrality [as]
all three relate to job qualifications, performance, and/or experience.”
48
This
supports the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that “the more general exception [‘factor
other than sex’] should be limited to legitimate, job-related reasons as well.”
49
The Ninth Circuit’s application of the canon of ejusdem generis also
supports this reading. The canon requires that a general term, when appearing at
the end of a list of more specific terms, be “construed to embrace only objects
similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.”
50
In reading the other exceptions as related to qualifications, performance, or
experience, the court concluded that “[a] similar factor would have to be one
similar to the other legitimate, job-related reasons” provided in the EPA.
51
Because the court found that salary history bore an attenuated relationship from
these valid metrics, it determined that prior salary “does not fit within the catchall
exception because it is not a legitimate measure of work experience, ability,
performance, or any other job-related quality.”
52
Alternatively, the exception could be interpreted as any factor besides sex,
including any business-related factor other than sex, encompassing salary
history. Prior to its most recent ruling, the Ninth Circuit had “relied upon
the express language of the EPA which says a pay differential is nonactionable
if the differential is pursuant to ‘a differential based on any other factor other
47. Rizo, 887 F.3d at 460.
48. Id. at 461-62 (internal citations omitted).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 462.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 467.
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than sex.’”
53
Although not explicitly relying on the canons of construction, this
argument identifies a more general unifying characteristic between the
exceptions: they are all business-related.
54
Given “virtually every dictionary
defines the word ‘any’ as ‘regardless of kind,’” then the appropriate reading of
“any other factor other than sex” is any factor.
55
The use of the word “any” also
supports a broad reading of the fourth exception of the EPA. A broad reading of
the exception “expressly permit[s] an employer to assert prior salary history as a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for a pay differential.”
56
The Seventh Circuit takes this conclusion one step further. Based on the
court’s prior decisions in Dey and Covington, the court held that a “factor [other
than sex] need not be ‘related to the requirements of the particular position in
question,’ nor must it even be business-related.”
57
The Ninth Circuit’s earlier
precedent in Kouba, characterizing the fourth exception as business-related
factors other than sex, is directly criticized by the Seventh Circuit. Writing for a
unanimous panel, Judge Easterbrook chastises the Ninth Circuit for originating
the acceptable business requirement without explaining its genesis, in a move
that “was [as] advanced as ukase.”
58
The rebuke extends to all circuits that have
followed the same reasoning because the acceptable business reason requirement
is not grounded in the statutory text.
59
Under this expansively interpreted
exception to the EPA, salary history is a legitimate business consideration, on
par with seniority and merit pay systems.
Pretext & Business Judgment
In its decision in Corning, the Supreme Court concluded that the company’s
ongoing disparity in base wages between night and day workers was pretext and
“operated to perpetuate the effects of the company’s prior illegal practice of
paying women less than men for equal work.”
60
Accordingly, the Court found
the wage differential discriminatory, despite being “phrased in terms of a neutral
factor other than sex.”
61
This decision supports scrutiny by courts to ensure that
when an employer asserts an affirmative defense, it is not a pretext or post-hoc
53. Brief of Appellants at 26, Rizo v. Yovino, 2016 WL 3901069 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 16-15372)
(emphasis added) (citing Kouba, 691 F.2d at 875).
54. Some courts have noted that a “factor other than sex” does not include literally any other factor,
but any factor that was adopted for a legitimate business reason. See Bence v. Detroit Health Corp., 712
F.2d 1024, 1029-31 (6th Cir. 1983).
55. Jeffrey K. Brown, Crossing the Line: The Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits’
Misapplication of the Equal Pay Act’s “Any Other Factor Other Than Sex” Defense, 13 HOFSTRA LAB.
& EMP. L.J. 181, 191 (1995).
56. Brief of Appellants, supra note 53, at 26 (citing Kouba, 691 F.2d at 877).
57. Wernsing, 427 F.3d 466 at 470.
58. Id. at 469.
59. Id.
60. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 209-10 (1974).
61. Id. at 209-10.
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rationalization for discrimination.
62
However, it is unclear if this decision would
permit courts to assume bias in the underlying salary history because the EPA
“permit[s] employers to defend against charges of discrimination where their pay
differentials are based on a bona fide use of ‘other factors other than sex.’”
63
Courts vary greatly in how closely they review these determinations,
particularly with regard to pretext. The Second Circuit frames the pretext inquiry
as “whether the employer has use[d] the factor reasonably in light of the
employer’s stated purpose as well as its other practices.”
64
The Second Circuit
has also held that “an employer bears the burden of proving that a bona fide
business-related reason exists for using the gender-neutral factor that results in a
wage differential.”
65
In determining whether an employer’s use of a civil service
exam and job classification system were permissible, the court held that these
systems could constitute an affirmative defense as a factor other than sex “if
defendants prove that the system is bona fide,” meaning the employer “must
prove that the exam for custodians and the practice of filling the custodian’s
position only from among the top three scorers on the exam are related to
performance of the custodian’s job.”
66
In comparison, the Sixth Circuit reviewed an employer’s “head of
household” provision, which permitted employees to extend medical and dental
coverage to a spouse, but only if the spouse earned less than the employee. The
court found the policy justified by business interests, as an employer could
legitimately conclude that “choosing a comprehensive fringe benefit package
faces the challenge of maximizing employee satisfaction while minimizing or
controlling cost.”
67
In Judge Hillman’s dissent, he notes several reasons why he
is critical of the relationship between the head of household policy and the
company’s purported justifications. These reasons include: (1) the comparatively
low percentage of female employees eligible for spousal benefits, (2) that “nearly
three-fourths of the affected employees . . . were female,” (3) that benefits
extended “to so few employees is not reasonably related to . . . [the company’s]
asserted justification of maximizing employee satisfaction,” and (4) that there
was no evidence of employee satisfaction increases.
68
In the context of prior salary history, the analysis of pretext is related to the
court’s assessment of an employer’s business judgment. In Gunther, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that “courts and administrative agencies are not
permitted to substitute their judgment for the judgment of the employer . . . who
62. Some courts have used clear language to hold there is no valid affirmative defense for “illusory”
and “post-event” justification for unequal pay. See e.g., Odomes v. Nucare, Inc., 653 F.2d 246, 251-52
(6th Cir. 1981).
63. Washington Cty. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170 (1981).
64. Aldrich v. Randolph Ctr. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 526 (2d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 527.
67. EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249, 253 (6th Cir. 1988).
68. Id. at 255 (Hillman, J., dissenting).
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[has] established and applied a bona fide job rating system so long as it does not
discriminate on the basis of sex.”
69
The interpretation of the catchall exception
can vary based on a court’s perspective of its role in reviewing business decisions
that result in pay disparities.
For instance, the Seventh Circuit explained that “Congress has not
authorized federal judges to serve as personnel managers for America’s
employers,” which is why a broad reading of the catchall exception supports
deference to employers in exercising business judgment.
70
This interpretation
underpins the court’s general reasoning, that while “[i]t remains possible that pay
differences between men and women reflect discrimination,” such discrepancies
can also be attributed to individual “choices made about allocating time between
family and market endeavors.”
71
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit’s holding is infused with far less deference to
an employer’s business judgment because “[n]ot every reason that makes
economic sense—in other words, that is business related—constitutes an
acceptable factor other than sex.”
72
In an effort to sidestep “too many improper
justifications for avoiding the strictures of the Act,” the court relies on intent and
precedent to support its interpretation, which prohibits actions by employers that
aim “to capitalize on the persistence of the wage gap and perpetuate that gap ad
infinitum.”
73
These interpretive differences are explored further in the context of
legislative history and precedent. These comparisons underscore how the court’s
perspective of its role in resolving these issues, as well as a court’s willingness
to be critical of business judgments, impact the contours of how “any other factor
other than sex” is interpreted across the various circuits.
C. Summarizing the Circuit Courts’ Legislative History Arguments
The Supreme Court analyzed the legislative history of the EPA in its
decision in Corning. In a later decision that discusses the Corning Court’s
analysis, the Supreme Court found that the “language and legislative history of
69. Washington Cty. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 171 (1981) (internal citation omitted).
70. Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Services, 427 F.3d 466, 468 (7th Cir. 2005).
71. Id. at 471.
72. Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d at 466 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Corning,
which “readily dismissed the notion that an employer may pay women less under the catchall exception
because women cost less to employ, thus saving the employer money. The Court explained that the market
forces theory—that women will be willing to accept lower salaries because they will not find higher
salaries elsewhere—did not constitute a factor other than sex even though such a method of setting salaries
could have saved the company a considerable amount and so would have constituted a good business
reason.”) (internal quotations omitted).
73. Id. at 456-57, 466.
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the provision are not unambiguous,” adding to the complexity of the salary
history debate.
74
The Court begins its analysis of the legislative history by noting that the
original version of the EPA created only two exceptions, for seniority or merit
systems; this was met by pushback from witnesses during the House and Senate
committee hearings.
75
Those exceptions were insufficient to account for the
“formal, systematic job evaluation plans” used by many employers “to establish
equitable wage structures in their plants” by taking into account “four separate
factors in determining job value—skill, effort, responsibility and working
conditions.”
76
In addition, critics of the bill expressed concerns that the EPA’s
language was “unduly vague and incomplete” and that the “Secretary of Labor
would be cast in the position of second-guessing the validity of a company’s
job evaluation system.”
77
The Court observes that “Congress acted in direct
response to these pleas” by amending the EPA to reflect that equal pay also
required “equal effort, responsibility, and similar working conditions,” which
were at the heart of job classifications, formed a “legitimate basis for differentials
in pay.”
78
In sum, the Court concludes this demonstrates Congress’ intent to keep
“well-defined and well-accepted principles of job evaluation . . . [so] that wage
differentials based upon bona fide job evaluation plans would be outside the
purview of the Act.”
79
The Court relied upon this analysis of legislative history in Corning to
conclude that the fourth affirmative defense was added to the EPA “because of
a concern that bona fide job-evaluation systems used by American businesses
would otherwise be disrupted.”
80
Circuit courts have relied upon this legislative
history analysis in interpreting the EPA, but have also added to this interpretative
context.
References to written reports provide additional insight for interpreting the
EPA. The Ninth Circuit references the House Committee’s report, which
characterizes “a bona fide job classification program” as one “that does not
discriminate on the basis of sex will serve as a valid defense to a charge of
discrimination.”
81
The court also relied upon the committee’s “illustrative list of
other factors in addition to job classification programs which would be covered
under the fourth exception” which included “shift differentials, restrictions on or
differences based on time of day worked, hours of work, lifting or moving heavy
74. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 168.
75. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 199 (1974).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 200.
78. Id. at 200-01 (internal citations omitted).
79. Id. at 201.
80. Rizo, 887 F.3d at 464 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 88-309, at 3 (1963), as reprinted in 1963
U.S.C.C.A.N. 687, 689).
81. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 88-309, at 3 (1963), as reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 687, 689).
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objects, differences based on experience, training, or ability.”
82
The Ninth
Circuit also notes the “Senate Committee Report likewise confirms that
Congress intended the catchall exception to cover factors other than sex only
insofar as they were job related.”
83
This analysis is largely echoed by the Second
Circuit, which also refers to the report, in noting that while “there are many
factors which may be used to measure the relationships between jobs and which
establish a valid basis for a difference in pay . . . a bona fide job classification
program that does not discriminate on the basis of sex will serve as a valid
defense.”
84
Gunther and Rizo both make reference to Representative Robert Griffin, but
rely on different statements by the congressman to support their analysis. In
Gunther, the Court noted that Representative Griffin’s explanation “that the
fourth affirmative defense is a ‘broad principle,’ which ‘makes clear and
explicitly states that a differential based on any factor or factors other than sex
would not violate this legislation.’”
85
The Ninth Circuit quotes Representative
Griffin’s description of the catchall exception: “Roman numeral iv is a broad
principle, and those preceding it are really examples.”
86
Both statements may be
reconciled when read in unison; however, when read independently from one
another, it is possible these two statements, though made by the same person,
could be construed in multiple ways to support various conclusions.
By contrast, the Seventh Circuit dismisses reliance on legislative history by
posing this question: “But what relevance can this have now that anti-
discrimination statutes have been in force for more than two generations?”
87
D. Examining the EPA’s Purpose in the Circuits’ Rationales
Courts have also evaluated the purpose of the EPA in assessing the scope of
a “factor other than sex.” The Supreme Court, in its decision in Corning, stated,
“Congress’ purpose in enacting the Equal Pay Act was to remedy what was
perceived to be a serious and endemic problem of employment discrimination”
to eliminate wage structures that reflected “an ancient but outmoded belief that
a man, because of his role in society, should be paid more than a woman even
though his duties are the same.”
88
Additionally, in interpreting the EPA as a
broadly remedial statute, the Supreme Court held the Act “should be construed
82. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
83. Id.
84. Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 525.
85. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 171 (citing 109 CONG. REC. 9203 (1963)) (also noting the statements of
several other legislators that aligned with Representative Griffin’s statements, citing remarks made by
Reps. Frelinghuysen, Thompson, Goodell, Kelly, Pucinski, and Thompson).
86. Rizo, 887 F.3d at 464.
87. Wernsing, 427 F.3d at 471.
88. Corning, 417 U.S. at 195 (citing S. REP. NO. 88-176, at 1 (1963)).
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and applied so as to fulfill the underlying purposes which Congress sought to
achieve.”
89
In its most recent decision in Rizo, the Ninth Circuit has determined that “it
is inconceivable that Congress, in an Act the primary purpose of which was to
eliminate long-existing endemic sex-based wage disparities, would create an
exception for basing new hires’ salaries on those very disparities—disparities
that Congress declared are not only related to sex but caused by sex.”
90
Relying
on the broad remedial purpose of the statute, the Ninth Circuit concludes
“Congress simply could not have intended to allow employers to rely on these
discriminatory wages as a justification for continuing to perpetuate wage
differentials.”
91
This is particularly evident when recognizing that at the time of
the EPA was passed, “an employee’s prior pay would have reflected a
discriminatory marketplace that valued the equal work of one sex over the
other.”
92
Although the Second Circuit ultimately reaches a different conclusion than
the Ninth Circuit, the court in Aldrich concludes that “job classification systems
may qualify under the factor-other-than-sex defense only when they are based
on legitimate business-related considerations also comports with the general
policy goals Congress sought to effectuate by enacting equal pay legislation.”
93
The court notes that in the absence of “a job-relatedness requirement, the factor-
other-than-sex defense would provide a gaping loophole in the statute through
which many pretexts for discrimination would be sanctioned.”
94
These perspectives of the EPA’s purpose stand in contrast to the Seventh
Circuit’s analysis. The court prioritizes the “benefit of making the job more
attractive to the best candidates—because the state’s civil service criteria call for
more attention to employees’ background and skills than to the market.”
95
Judge
Easterbrook’s opinion suggests the opposition’s analysis is “manufactured by the
judges rather than discovered by digging through legislative debates” and “lacks
any footing in enacted texts.”
96
Rather than elevating the EPA’s purpose, the
Seventh Circuit opinion eschews purpose in arriving at its decision to always
permit the use of salary history as a “factor other than sex.”
89. Id. at 208.
90. Rizo, 887 F.3d at 460.
91. Id. at 461.
92. Id.
93. Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 525.
94. Id.
95. Wernsing, 427 F.3d at 468.
96. Id. at 470.
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III. THE STATUS OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL LEGISLATION
Ongoing litigation on the federal level has deepened the circuit split
regarding whether prior salary history is a permissible affirmative defense based
on “a factor other than sex.” However, the debate regarding prior salary history
is not cabined to the judicial arena. This Section briefly describes how legislative
action on the state level provides a rich backdrop against which to analyze the
circuit split, especially in the wake of federal inaction on this question.
Although the Equal Pay Act does not permit wage discrimination, it was not
understood to afford protection on the federal level to safeguard against
disclosure of past salary information—until the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rizo
prohibited reliance on salary history under the EPA. State legislation regarding
prior salary history, on the other hand, has multiplied in recent years. At least
five states, including Massachusetts, Delaware, New York, California, and
Oregon, in addition to several cities, have also passed measures that ban
employers from inquiring about salary history.
97
New Jersey’s governor signed
an executive order to address this issue.
98
The scope and protections of these laws vary. The Massachusetts law, for
instance, includes an anti-retaliation provision.
99
Delaware’s provision includes
strong punitive measures, including “penalties from $1,000 to $5,000 for a first
offense, and up to $10,000 for a subsequent offense.”
100
New York City’s
provision includes even more severe fines. While “unknowing” violations can
result in penalties as high as $125,000, “knowing and continuing” violations can
be fined up to $250,000.
101
The proliferation of state legislation to ban prior salary history is ongoing.
In addition to Florida and New Hampshire, which “already have pay equity bills
drafted for consideration in their respective 2018 legislative sessions,” another
eleven states are considering “passing similar salary history ban laws” this
year.
102
Although growing in popularity, not all legislative efforts to ban prior
salary history have been successful.
For example, last August, Illinois Governor Bruce Rauner vetoed a bill that
would prohibit employers from inquiring about an applicant’s salary history,
97. Ryan Golden & Valerie Bolden-Barrett, Women Who Refuse to Disclose Salary History More
Likely to Be Paid Less, HRDRIVE (June 29, 2017), https://www.hrdive.com/news/women-who-refuse-to-
disclose-salary-history-more-likely-to-be-paid-less/445993/ [https://perma.cc/T62W-524D].
98. N.J. Exec. Order 2018-01 (Feb. 1, 2018), http://nj.gov/governor/news/news/562018/approved/
20180116a_eo.shtml [https://perma.cc/KTG4-WWE7].




101. Joseph Maddaloni Jr. & Cynthia L. Flanagan, Salary History Ban Laws Aim to Close Gender
Pay Gaps, N.J. L. J. (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/2018/03/20/salary-history-ban-
laws-aim-to-close-gender-pay-gaps [https://perma.cc/8BL7-SRLM].
102. Id.
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although the bill passed in a bipartisan manner and by a wide margin in both the
state House (91-24) and Senate (35-18).
103
In his veto message, Governor Rauner
favorably acknowledged the Massachusetts salary history law as a best-in-the-
country approach because of its benefits—for employers.
104
Governor Rauner
encouraged the Illinois legislature to adopt Massachusetts’ legislative language,
underscoring a provision that permits employers to seek pay history once they
have offered a candidate the job and salary. The exclusion of this provision from
the Illinois bill was viewed positively, as some advocates have expressed
concern that post-offer salary disclosures “could reduce an employee’s raise or
bonus down the road if it is revealed he or she was earning much less before,”
effectively undermining the purpose of the legislation.
105
Despite the bill’s
popularity, and the fact that a “veto override [would] require 71 votes in the
House and 36 in the Senate,” the state legislature has failed to override the veto—
twice—effectively rendering the legislation dead.
106
The activity on the state and local level reflects a willingness to act in the
face of federal stagnation on wage parity efforts, as Congress has not been able
to pass legislation to address pay disparities resulting from salary history.
Perhaps most notable is Congress’ failure in prior sessions to pass the Paycheck
Fairness Act, which was most recently re-introduced in 2019.
107
The proposed
Paycheck Fairness Act includes a provision banning the use of wage, salary, and
benefit history in “considering the prospective employee for employment” or in
“determining the wages for such employment . . . [unless] voluntarily provided
by a prospective employee . . . to support a wage higher than the wage offered
by the employer.”
108
The legislation would also prohibit employers from
requesting prior salary directly from a prospective employee’s past employers
and protect employees from retaliation.
109
In addition to creating a limit to the
“any other factor other than sex” catchall exception currently in the EPA, the Act
103. Illinois Governor Vetoes Ban on Salary History Inquiries, GARTNER INC. (Aug. 31, 2017),
https://www.cebglobal.com/talentdaily/illinois-governor-vetoes-ban-on-salary-history-inquiries/
[https://perma.cc/BV5J-G8Z2].
104. Memorandum from Bruce Rauner, Governor of Illinois, to Ill. House of Representatives,100th
General Assembly (Aug. 25, 2017), http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/fulltext.asp?DocName=10000HB
2462gms&GA=100&SessionId=91&DocTypeId=HB&LegID=103476&DocNum=2462&GAID=14&S
ession [https://perma.cc/FJ2V-YR9Z]; see also Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, Rauner Vetoes Bill That Would Bar
Employers From Asking About Salary History, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 28, 2017), http://www.chi
cagotribune.com/business/ct-illinois-no-salary-history-bill-veto-0829-biz-20170828-story.html [https://
perma.cc/2NLE-9XQL].
105. Monique Garcia, Dems push Gov. Rauner to sign bill advocates say could bring women more
equal pay, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-met-rauner-
wage-bill-democrats-20180808-story.html [https://perma.cc/KD8H-N9Y6].
106. Elejalde-Ruiz, supra note 104; see also Kate Tornone, Second Attempt at Illinois Salary History
Ban Fails, HR DIVE (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.hrdive.com/news/second-attempt-at-illinois-salary-
history-ban-fails/510534 [https://perma.cc/S5BP-6P5G].
107. Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 7, 116th Cong. § 10 (2019); Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 270, 116th
Cong. § 8 (2019)
108. H.R. 7; S. 270.
109. H.R. 7; S. 270.
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would provide a specific penalty: employers would be “liable to each employee
or prospective employee who was the subject of the violation for special
damages not to exceed $10,000 plus attorneys’ fees, and shall be subject to such
injunctive relief as may be appropriate.”
110
Especially since the start of the TrumpAdministration, many advocates have
grown increasingly concerned about pay parity efforts on the federal level. Most
significantly, Trump suspended an Obama-era policy that would have required
“private employers with over 100 workers [to] have had to disclose pay data to
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on top of information on
gender, race, and ethnicity already provided to the agency,” which advocates are
concerned will decrease transparency and allow the pay gap to grow.
111
The
Trump Administration also rolled back other pay equity efforts, including the
White House Equal Pay Pledge, just days after taking office. The pledge
“encouraged companies to take action to advance equal pay” and included
notable companies such “Patagonia, Estée Lauder, InterContinental Hotels,
Mastercard, Yahoo, Square and Zillow.”
112
In the absence of federal legislation and in the wake of these executive acts,
there is increasing pressure on the courts to resolve the circuit split on this
question. This would make clear whether additional federal legislation is
necessary to add protections for employees nationwide, or if existing protections
under the EPA are sufficient to ensure true pay equality for women. The current
state of affairs, with federal legislation unlikely to be forthcoming and the
question still hotly contested among the circuits, also heightens the importance
of developing state-level policies designed to combat barriers to wage parity,
including prior salary history, in order to create affirmative protections not
otherwise guaranteed through litigation or legislation.
IV. POLICY AND POLITICALCONSIDERATIONS INDETERMINING THENEXT
STEPS OF THE SALARYHISTORYDEBATE
This Section identifies central issues that are likely to influence the national
debate regarding the role of salary history in employment decisions. Situated
within the larger salary history discussion, these issues concern the efficacy of
110. H.R. 7; S. 270.
111. Clare O’Connor, Trump Halting Equal Pay Measure “‘A Blatant Attack On Women,’” Activists
Say, FORBES (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor/2017/08/30/trump-halting-
equal-pay-measure-a-blatant-attack-on-women-activists-say/#a39aa2a395b1 [https://perma.cc/T7K7-J9
Q3].
112. Mandana Massoumi, INSIGHT: A Wave of Statewide Equal Pay Legislation Continues Despite
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salary history bans, the role of courts and legislatures, the use of prior salary in
negotiations, and the unique impact on women of color.
Prior to analyzing these considerations, consider an illustrative example to
demonstrate the significance of the wage gap: assume that a man’s starting salary
is $5,000 more than a woman’s. In addition to the immediate differential in their
earning, over time this gap is exacerbated. First, even if raises are given at the
same percent each year, because the base amount the man receives is higher, so
too is the dollar value that is represented by an equal percentage raise. What
started as a $5,000 gap per year grows into a differential that is more than
$15,000 per year over four decades; in this example, the gap has grown more
than three times.
113
In addition to an annual differential, there is a huge gap in
the cumulative earnings between these employees. By the time the two workers
are 60, extra earnings for the male total over $360,000.
114
Finally, the wage
differential is made more acute by added value of savings, which augment this
differential. Putting the salary differential into a savings account with 3 percent
interest would put the man’s total earnings at nearly $570,000 more than the
woman’s total earnings.
115
This example demonstrates the impact of the wage gap, not only in direct
earnings and day-to-day expenditures for women, but in the compounding nature
of this differential. An initial disparity creates a wealth gap that increasingly
impacts the economic security and wealth-building opportunities for women
over the long-term.
Although these figures help quantify the impact and escalation of wage
differentials, even when differences are initially minor, these numbers fail to
capture how this impacts the lived experiences of women. Betty Dukes was the
named plaintiff in a claim againstWal-Mart for gender discrimination in pay and
promotion policies and practices.
116
She described the direct and personal impact
of her lower salary by explaining: “When you subtract my living [expenses], I’m
not living — I’m existing. I have an 88-year-old mother. Economically, there’s
nothing I can do for my mom to make her life more golden in her golden years,




115. See JEANNE H. BALLANTINE, KEITH A. ROBERTS, KATHLEEN ODELL KORGEN, OUR SOCIAL
WORLD: INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY (2016).
116. Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
117. Dave Jamieson, Betty Dukes, Renowned Dukes v. Walmart Plaintiff, Takes Her Fight Back to
Capitol Hill, HUFFINGTON POST (Jun. 20, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/20/betty-
dukes-walmart-supreme-court_n_1613305.html [https://perma.cc/FBX9-PC8F] (discussing plaintiff in
Dukes v. Walmart after the Supreme Court failed to certify what would have been the largest class action
lawsuit in U.S. history, representing a proposed class of more than a million women alleging gender
discrimination in pay and promotion policies and practices).
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A. Assessing the Implementation and Efficacy of Salary History Bans
An ongoing point of contention, even among advocates who all favor pay
equity, is whether banning the use of prior salary history is an effective remedy
to resolve the pay gap. Although salary history prohibitions are meant to close
the gender wage gap, they may also have adverse consequences. Employers may
assume that women who refuse to disclose their pay have earned less or that they
are more determined to negotiate their salary aggressively, making them a less
appealing candidate. Women may also be perceived adversely for initiating
salary negotiations, even if men are not similarly penalized.
118
Other concerns have been expressed about existing legislative measures
banning the use of prior salary history. For instance, even though the
Massachusetts law provided other employment protections, some have been
critical of the bill’s salary history provision as superfluous. A main critique is
that employers have a work-around: asking prospective employees about their
salary expectations.HR Professionals Magazine provides several suggestions of
questions that employers should ask in lieu of salary history, including: “‘What
are your salary expectations?’ This gives the candidate the ability to share what
they seek to make for the role. It lets you decide if you should keep talking with
them. It also tells you whether they’ve done their homework or not.”
119
There is an additional concern that adopting a particular policy or standard
will have the effect of backing courts and legislatures into a corner, especially if
the adopted rule is not effective. The process of undoing precedent or rescinding
legislation may be even more difficult. Those persuaded by this argument might
support the adoption of the middle-ground approach taken by most circuits,
which permits the consideration of salary history in limited circumstances and
under close scrutiny by the courts. As expressed in Taylor, the Eighth Circuit
was “reluctant to establish a per se rule that might chill the legitimate use of
gender-neutral policies and practices.”
120
This moderate approach may help
build judicial consensus, while also balancing the concerns of employers and
employees.
118. Lydia Frank, Why Banning Questions About Salary History May Not Improve Pay Equity,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/09/why-banning-questions-about-salary-history-
may-not-improve-pay-equity [https://perma.cc/6C7D-94EX].
119. The Salary History Question: Alternatives for Recruiters and Hiring Managers, HR PROF’LS
MAG. (2017), http://hrprofessionalsmagazine.com/the-salary-history-question-alternatives-for-recruiters-
and-hiring-managers [https://perma.cc/NT38-RZQD].
120. Taylor v. White, 321 F.3d 710, 719 (8th Cir. 2003).
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B. Evaluating the Most Effective Actor: Courts vs. Legislatures
With both active federal litigation over the EPA’s application to prior salary
history and a marked increase in state and local legislation on the issue, many
equal pay advocates may question which approach to favor.
While it might be quicker for the Supreme Court to resolve the circuit split,
there are potential shortcomings to judicial interventions for equal pay. Judge
Nancy Gertner assesses employment discrimination law’s skewed evolution in
her essay entitled Losers’ Rules. She contends that judicial remedies are
inadequate to address gender-based employment discrimination, including the
gender pay gap, despite long-standing legislation that makes it illegal for
employers to discriminate on the basis of sex. As such, while litigation efforts
should continue, state legislation should be an ongoing focus for equal pay
advocates.
First, Judge Gertner asserts, judges do not see the strongest cases of
discrimination because they are settled rather than litigated.
121
Second,
defendants prevail more frequently at the summary judgment stage, likely in part
because the plaintiff bears the burden of proof in employment discrimination
cases.
122
Additionally, when a court grants defendants summary judgment, it
authors an opinion in opposition to the plaintiff; however, when courts deny
summary judgment, the case proceeds to trial and no pro-plaintiff record is
established.
123
Finally, interpretive bias resolves ambiguity in favor of
defendants, creating another advantage for employers.
124
Such asymmetrical decision making has created a one-sided body of law that
undermines the plaintiffs who challenge gender-based employment
discrimination. As a result, judges follow distorted precedent that reifies and
affirms the biased judicial decision-making process. Moreover, courts are more
likely to presumptively view gender-based employment discrimination claims as
trivial, particularly in factually complex or ambiguous cases, giving defendants
the benefit of the doubt.
125
Inconsistent pay for plaintiffs’ attorneys, protracted
lawsuits, and high litigation costs complicate litigation and often create
121. Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. F. 109, 115 (2012).
122. Id. (basing claim on Federal Judicial Center report, summary judgment motions, which are
overwhelmingly brought by defendants, were granted more often in employment discrimination cases
than in the aggregate).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 118 (ignoring explicitly discriminatory statements, such as in the “stray remarks” doctrine,
fundamentally distorts the outcome of discrimination cases by dismissing direct evidence of bias upon
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additional incentives to settle.
126
These aspects of the judicial system reinforce a
strong pro-defendant narrative that, when juxtaposed with an anti-plaintiff
judicial decision-making framework, makes it more difficult for claims to
succeed.
These biases in the litigation process have substantial implications for the
power dynamics between the parties and make it is easy to see why a legislative
resolutionmay be preferable. However, state policymaking is not without its own
challenges. For instance, preemption laws have been used to usurp local





Most recently, preemption laws have been a dominant instrument in state
regulation to squelch local experimentation and curtail the expansion of
employment protections. Such efforts have been successfully used to preempt
localities from setting minimum wage laws. For example, cities and counties
have been extremely effective in passing legislation to increase the minimum
wage, demonstrated by the fact that “more than 40 cities or counties in states
such as California, NewMexico, and Arizona have adopted local minimumwage
laws.”
129
As a result, at least twenty-five states currently have “laws that preempt
cities from passing their own local minimum wage laws.”
130
Efforts in some
states, like Missouri, have been in direct opposition to city expansions.
Missouri’s preemption law will effectively roll back “St. Louis’ $10-an-hour
minimum wage ordinance passed earlier this year . . . [meaning] thousands of
minimum-wage earners in the city could go back to earning the state rate of $7.70
an hour.”
131
Advancement of local and state policies has the impact of substantively
expanding employment protections within those geographic areas. While state
policymaking would require a piecemeal approach, achieve less consistent
nationwide practices, and face potential preemption challenges, these policies
can help ensure that pay gaps, particularly for women, are not compounded over
time. These laws can complement the protections of the EPA or potentially
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provide additional coverage, depending on the ultimate interpretation adopted by
the Supreme Court. Moreover, the laboratories of democracy theory suggests
that experimentation with various policies can also help bring to light unintended
consequences of such laws and help advocates move closer to the goal of pay
parity.
These state and local policies may also catalyze broader change. For
instance, national companies seeking to adopt a consistent practice within their
organization may change organization-wide salary-setting practices if they
operate in at least one state with a salary history ban. Several industry-leading
employers “like Amazon, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and Progressive have
eliminated salary history questions from the hiring process, and other employers
are following suit.”
132
One recent survey found that nearly 40% of surveyed
employers “had implemented a policy to stop asking about a candidate’s salary
history” and that 40% of employers without an existing policy were likely to
adopt a salary history ban in the next 12 months. Thus, even in the absence of a
consistent national policy or uniform interpretation of existing legislation,
widespread discourse on the issue, or even a single state’s policy, could have
national consequences.
133
Although there are benefits to a federal approach, “the policymaking
benefits associated with devolution, including mutual learning, iterative
regulation, helpful redundancy, and healthy competition” suggest that state and
local policymaking should be more than a secondary alternative.
134
As Heather
Gerken explains in Federalism 3.0, “the fact that states are embedded in a federal
regime also allows them to play a crucial role in defending congressional
prerogatives, checking executive overreach, and safeguarding the separation of
powers.”
135
States should be viewed as robust democratic actors. Accordingly,
the development of state and local legislation is an affirmative strategy to pursue,
not in lieu of federal legislation, but as a complement to national policymaking
efforts. Ultimately, our policies benefit from the refinement that results from the
interaction between federal and state actors; this iterative process is a function of
the structure of our democracy itself, where “[c]ooperative federalism is paired
with uncooperative federalism,” to create a feedback loop within the system of
checks and balances.
136
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C. Accounting for the Impact of Salary History in Negotiations
While experts have posited many reasons for pay discrepancies—ranging
from occupational segregation, to the impacts of maternity leave and
motherhood, to overt discrimination—gender pay inequity persists.
137
These
major and systemic workplace issues impact working women daily, as does “the
lack of adequate lactation rooms in most office buildings, antiquated office dress
codes that require women to wear high heels to work and the size of safety gear
available[, such as those used by] female astronauts [and soldiers].”
138
Salary negotiations are another possible cause of pay disparities, and
negotiations often prompt questions related to salary history. As illustrated in the
earlier example, salary differentials can result in both short-term and long-term
inequities.
139
Even an initially small pay disparity can eventually lead to
disparities of several hundred thousand dollars. Lower salaries constrain
spending, whereas a worker’s ability to save generates additional earnings. In
this way, seemingly small differences in pay result in substantial long-term
inequities.
There are other concerns about the use of salary history in the pay
negotiation and wage-setting process. The National Women’s Law Center
(“NWLC”) identifies several additional complications. First, NWLC cites recent
research that proves that women, particularly women of color, face bias in the
salary-setting process. In an experiment, researchers found that employers
offered the male applicant, John, a salary nearly $4,000 higher than the female
applicant, Jennifer, despite the fact that both candidates had identical resumés,
expect for the name.
140
Intentional or not, conscious or otherwise, this bias
increases the likelihood that women will face disparities that are magnified, not
137. See Nikki Graf, Anna Brown & Eileen Patten, The Narrowing, but Persistent, Gender Gap in
Pay, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/03/22/gender-pay-
gap-facts/ [https://perma.cc/PQ3N-SHYL]; Miriam Valverde, Hillary Clinton Says Donald Trump
Doesn’t Believe in Equal Pay, POLITIFACT (Nov. 2, 2016), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/statements/2016/nov/02/hillary-clinton/hillary-clinton-says-donald-trump-doesnt-believe-e
[https://perma.cc/AGZ2-R3L2].
138. These institutional barriers are as embedded and routine as “temperature setting, [which] in
most workplaces is calibrated to men’s metabolic rates, so women are often uncomfortably cold,” which
chills strides towards full inclusion of women in all careers. Marisa Porges, What the Failed All-Female
Spacewalks Tells Us About Office Temperature: In a For-Men, By-Men World, the Little Things Still
Really Do Matter, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/27/opinion/nasa-
female-spacewalk.html [https://perma.cc/4U8D-TDDU].
139. CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW, ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER & LELA PORTER LOVE,
NEGOTIATION: APPROPRIATE PROCESS AND PROBLEM SOLVING (2006).
140. National Women’s LawCenter, Asking for Salary History Perpetuates Pay Discrimination from
Job to Job (June 2017), https://www.cwlc.org/download/fact-sheet-asking-for-salary-history-perpetuates-
pay-discrimination-from-job-to-job/?wpdmdl=4689&ind=18BbgOnmocYqZp4_mv06F7CjAivNg3wj3g
jP5CXH4qf-zNYNZRnH8IT0pAsVDTcnZ-L6ClTL7w3seubhA7Ca3J-0CTlNeEztBdEIP1kvbus
[https://perma.cc/E5H2-QG3V] (referencing Corrine A. Moss-Racusin et al., Science Faculty’s Subtle
Gender Biases Favor Male Students, PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. (Aug. 2012),
http://www.pnas.org/content/109/41/16474.abstract#aff-1 [https://perma.cc/FCL5-6X6H]).
160 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 31:1
neutralized, by the salary negotiation process. In addition, “women are more
likely to have worked in lower paid, female-dominated professions that pay low
wages simply because women are the majority of workers in the occupation.”
141
Moreover, because women carry “the majority of caregiving responsibilities,”
they are more likely “to reduce their hours or leave the workforce to care for
children and other family members.”
142
These dynamics also impact educated
women. Even though this group is “the least likely to stop working after having
children,” it is important to recognize the social and economic dynamics “that
push couples who have equal career potential to take on unequal roles,” as
women often move to less demanding jobs or reduce their hours in order to
accommodate their partner’s career and earning potential.
143
Recognizing that
“[w]omen don’t step back from work because they have rich husbands … [but
that] [t]hey have rich husbands because they step back from work” is the first
step to understanding how this phenomenon intersects with the compounding
effects of the pay gap.
144
Overrepresentation in low-wage industries,
accumulation of unpaid caregiving responsibilities, and practical limitations on
earning capacity present additional hurdles for women to overcome in salary
negotiation.
In addition to these obstacles in negotiation, other challenges that result from
the use of prior salary history information include salaries that may not reflect
current market conditions or a candidate’s current qualifications; preemptive
screening of candidates because of salaries that are too high or too low, without
an assessment of skill, knowledge, or experience; and salary disclosures that
artificially deflate wages because employers are less likely to pay an applicant
significantly more than their previous role.
145
Courts have also recognized the difficulty of overcoming sexism in pay
negotiations. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Rizo notes the limits of its holding,
particularly with regard to salary negotiations:
Today we express a general rule and do not attempt to resolve its
applications under all circumstances. We do not decide, for example,
whether or under what circumstances past salary may play a role in the
course of an individualized salary negotiation. We prefer to reserve all
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Although specifically noting that the majority’s opinion “should in no way
be taken as barring or posing any obstacle to whatever resolution future panels
may reach regarding questions relating to such negotiations,” the concurrences
by Judges McKeown and Callahan express concern that this holding could upset
settled precedent.
147
While the Ninth Circuit’s ruling prohibits the reliance on salary history
generally, it is unclear if or how this holding can break a cycle that often occurs
in employment: prior salary is used to determine one’s new salary. When
employers are banned from inquiring about applicants’ previous wages,
applicants are relieved from having to disclose information that could be used
against them to artificially deflate their salary. This ban breaks the cycle of
underpayment. This rationale, which has prompted states like Massachusetts to
take action to remedy the pay gap, will likely a continuing influence ongoing
jurisprudence in about the use of prior salary history, particularly in the context
of negotiations.
148
D. Understanding the Implications for Women of Color Using the Lens of
Intersectionality
There are many employment challenges faced by women of all races,
including underrepresentation in high level, high-paying positions, and
overrepresentation in low-paying jobs.
149
Only 5 percent of CEOs at Fortune 500
companies are women.
150
Women comprise less than 30 percent of earners at the
top 10 percent and less than 20 percent of earners at the top 1 percent.
151
By
contrast, “[w]omen make up 63 percent of workers earning the federal minimum
wage, a wage rate stuck at $7.25 since 2009.”
152
Additionally, “[f]emale-
dominated occupations — such as childcare and restaurant service — continue
to occupy the lower rungs of the U.S. wage ladder.”
153
It should come as no surprise that the rates of female poverty are also
higher—with 13.4 million women (13.4%) aged 18-64 living in poverty, as
compared with 9.4 million (9.7%) of adult men.
154
This gap grows further when
comparing poverty rates for single-parent households with children, where
147. Id. at 468-78.
148. Frank, supra note 118.
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female-headed households “had a poverty rate of 35.6 percent, more than twice
the 17.3 percent rate for households led by single men with children.”
155
The gender wage gap also perpetuates the gender wealth gap, where earnings
over time result in an even wider schism between the sexes, both directly and
indirectly. Wage disparities impact pension plan payments and Social Security
payouts, both of which are partly based past earnings.
156
More tangentially,
women have smaller retirement savings but longer life expectancies than men,
which are impacted by their earnings.
157
Women “hold nearly two-thirds of
outstanding student loan debt” even though they only make up about half of
college students.
158
These are just some of the ways women’s debt and savings
are uniquely impacted by the gender wage gap.
Ongoing research shows that pay disparities are often worse for women of
color.
159
According to research compiled by the American Association of
University Women (“AAUW”), most women of color face an even greater wage
gap than white non-Hispanic women, whose earnings were 77 percent that of
white men.
160
In comparison, native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander women
earn 65 percent, black women earn 61 percent, native women earn 58 percent,
and Latina women earn 53 percent as much as white men.
161
Only Asian women
outpace white non-Hispanic women, but still only earn 85 percent as much as
white men.
162
Accordingly, women of color are typically at an even greater
disadvantage and disproportionately bear the impact of the wage gap. As the
wage gap grows, so does the impact on the poverty and wealth gaps for women
of color.
Sociologists have investigated “how racial and gender discrimination play
important roles in creating and reinforcing this particular wage gap,” including
research demonstrating that “office rules are applied more harshly to women of
color than to others, and that some predominantly white workplaces have racially
inhospitable environments that serve to push women of color out.”
163
Researchers have also investigated “how black women working in male-
155. Id.
156. Id. (“In 2017, the $15,000 average annual Social Security benefit for women lagged the benefit
for men by $4,000.”).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. NAT’L PARTNERSHIP FORWOMEN&FAMILIES, QUANTIFYINGAMERICA’SGENDERWAGEGAP




160. KEVIN MILLER & DEBORAH J. VAGINS, THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT THE GENDER PAY GAP,




163. Adia Harvey Wingfield, About Those 79 Cents, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 17, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/79-cents/504386 [https://perma.cc/QP2L-ECZL].
2019] Salary History and Pay Parity 163
dominated executive ranks encounter both racial and gender stereotypes as well
as disparities in mentorship that limit their career trajectories.”
164
These studies
complement the findings of New York University researcher Deirdre Royster,
whose work shows “that social networks help white men more than black men
when it comes to looking for skilled jobs,” underscoring the importance of access
to insider networks.
165
This research is similar to the resumé study showing gender bias in salary-
setting, in which employers on average offered John a starting salary nearly
$4,000 more than Jennifer, although their resumés were otherwise identical.
166
Similar research has demonstrated that the same phenomenon occurs with
respect to race. One study of employers in Boston and Chicago found that white-
sounding names—Greg Baker and EmilyWalsh—generated a callback rate 50%
higher than that of equally qualified applicants with African-American-sounding
names—Lakisha Washington and Jamal Jones.
167
Another recent study showed
racial discrimination in the evaluation of identical writing samples. Half of the
reviewers were told the candidate was white and the other half were told the
candidate was African-American.
168
Even though the memos were identical,
“reviewers rated the memo thought to be written by a white man an average score
of 4.1 out of 5, while they rated the memo thought to be written by an African-
American man a score of 3.2 out of 5.”
169
These statistics illuminate a difficult
reality: “contemporary bias is often subtle, unconscious, and institutionally
based.”
170
Broad statistics like these contain useful insights for advocates of pay equity,
but they don’t tell the whole story. First, there is additional complexity within
the subgroups in the statistics cited. For instance, althoughAsian women are paid
more than women from other minority groups, the general group statistics do not
fully reflect the experiences of all Asian women, as there is also diversity within
this group. In the United States, Asian women “of Indian and Chinese descent
are on average paid better . . . but Burmese, Hmong, and Laotian women on
average are paid significantly less—60 percent or less of what white men are
paid.”
171
A simple comparison between ethnic groups glosses over the different
experiences of Asian women based on their country of origin.
Second, there are additional impacts on women who hold more than one
minority identity. As seen with the intersection of gender and race in
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employment, “[w]omen of color . . . experience particularly high levels of
poverty, unemployment, and other economic hardships.”
172
This is further compounded for women of color who are also members of




sexual orientation, or gender identity.
175
Adopting an intersectional
lens in which “categories like gender, race, and class are best understood as
overlapping and mutually constitutive rather than isolated and distinct” can
inform solutions that account for the experiences of all women.
176
The
importance of intersectionality is that it “deliberately focus[es] on those on the
fringes” to ensure that a “focus on women” includes all women.
177
The concept of intersectionality, first introduced by legal scholar Kimberlé
Crenshaw, recognizes that race and gender are interconnected and interrelated,
rather than discrete categories of analysis.
178
Because a person “does not
experience oppressions or privileges discretely, but simultaneously . . . women
of color often have unique intersectional experiences that neither men of color
nor white women can relate to.”
179
Intersectional problems require intersectional solutions. It is critical to
address bias in salary history, as well as other gender-based forms of
discrimination, ranging from stereotyping to the motherhood penalty, that afflict
all women. However, it is not sufficient to advocate for salary parity, pregnancy
or caregiver protections, or other policies that benefit women as a monolith. A
comprehensive and multi-faceted solution that is also intersectional will better
address the broad impacts of the gender wage gap, including its implications for
women’s access to housing, education, and credit. Implementing policies that
“improve the quality of jobs held mainly by women, tackle occupational
segregation, enforce equal pay and employment opportunities, and improve
work family benefits for all workers, will help the incomes of women and their
families grow and strengthen the economy.”
180
Accordingly, “any efforts to close
the gender-pay gap should address not just the processes that perpetuate gender
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that the pay gaps that remain are “driven only by differences in skill, education,
and experience—not by race or gender.”
181
V. CONCLUSION
The question of whether prior salary history is a “factor other than sex”
under the EPA will likely be determined by the Supreme Court, as the circuit
split on this question was not answered in the Court’s review of Ninth Circuit’s
en banc decision in Rizo. This Article summarizes the existing circuit divide on
this question, assessing arguments related to the statute’s text, legislative history,
and purpose. Additionally, state legislative efforts to address problems that arise
from the use of prior salary history provide important context for the evolution
of a national dialogue on this issue. Finally, while the policy consequences of the
ongoing salary history debate are uncertain, special attention should be paid to
the efficacy of salary history bans, the role of courts and legislatures in setting
the scope of use of salary history information, the impact of prior salary in
employment negotiations, and the unique barriers faced by women of color. In
addition to achieving the goal of pay equity through the elimination of prior
salary history, advocates should promote intersectional solutions that improve
the outcomes for all women. Such solutions include enhancing union protections,
mandating paid leave and flexible scheduling, and designing tax and economic
policies that help all workers. Ultimately, these court decisions, legislative
choices, and national discussions will help ensure that the fundamental goal of
the Equal Pay Act is realized: offering truly equal employment opportunities to
all workers, regardless of sex or salary history.
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